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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of changes in the funding of higher education in England on students’ 
choices and outcomes. Over the last two decades – through three major reforms in 1998, 2006 and 2012 – 
undergraduate university education in public universities moved from being free to students and state 
funded to charging substantial tuition fees to all students. This was done in conjunction with the 
government offering generous means-tested maintenance grants and loans. Using detailed longitudinal 
micro-data that follows all students attending state schools in England (more than 90 percent of all school-
aged children) from lower education to higher education, we document the socio-economic distributional 
effects of the 2006 and 2012 policy reforms on a comprehensive set of outcomes, including enrolment, 
relocation decisions, selection of institution, program of study, and performance within university. For a 
subset of students, we track them after completing higher education, allowing us to study the labour market 
effects of the policy reforms. Despite the substantial higher education funding reforms, we do not find 
large aggregate effect on student enrolment or on other margins. Moreover, the small negative impacts 
found on enrolment were largely borne on those in higher parts of the wealth distribution – reducing the 
enrolment gap across socioeconomic groups 
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1. Introduction
Higher education funding has become one of the most highly debated public policies of
recent times. The extent of cross-country variation in the levels of tuition fees charged and the 
degree of (and conditions for) means-tested financial support is remarkable (OECD, 2011). 
From no tuition fees and generous financial support in Nordic countries; moderate tuition fees 
and low levels of financial support across many continental European countries; to high tuition 
fees and generous financial support in parts of the US and UK.  Over the last 20 years, many 
OECD countries have observed reforms in their funding schemes, while many others are 
considering future reforms.   
One of the most significant reforms in recent times has been the one that took place in 
the UK. Until 1998, (full-time) undergraduate education in public universities in England and 
Wales was free of charge to students. However, in response to the declining quality of university 
education and rising costs, the government reformed the funding of higher education. The initial 
reform introduced in 1998, was later updated in 2006 and 2012. The reforms had three 
components: first, the introduction of tuition fees – initially means-tested at £1,000 per year, 
increasing to £3,000 per year in 2006 for all students and then eventually increasing to £9,000 
in 2012; second, the introduction of a loan system that allowed students to (annually) borrow 
up to the fee amount; and finally, support to low-income students, including means-tested grants 
of up to £3,700 per year and means-tested loans of up to £5,000 per year. Together these reforms 
aimed to shift the burden of higher education funding from the taxpayer to the beneficiary – the 
students themselves.  
In this paper, we use detailed longitudinal micro-data on all students in state schools in 
England to evaluate the short and longer effects of the 2006 reform and the short-run effects of 
the 2012 reforms. The paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the educational and 
labour market consequences of the English higher education reforms, focusing on its socio-
economic distributional effects. Following several cohorts of high school aged students, we can 
link the data to those entering university and then, eventually – for a sizeable subset of students 
– track them into the labour market. We identify the effect by comparing similar cohorts of
students before and after the reform changes. In particular, we have detailed information at the 
school level, as well at the neighbourhood level, allowing us to match individuals at a highly 
local level.  
We analyse the impact of the higher education reform changes on enrolment, as well as 
on a number of other margins. Since students might alter their choices relating to higher 
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education that might then have an impact on outcomes, it is important to understand if the 
reform impacted other dimensions of higher education choices. For instance, the reforms may 
have implications related to how students sort – both in higher education but also on the labour 
market. In particular, their choice of institution, its location, and program of study, as well as 
behaviour when in university – such as dropout, year-repetition, and program switching. 
Finally, we link the impact of the reform to later outcomes in the labour market, including their 
employment status, type of contract and earnings. 
Over the last two decades, the UK has reduced the amount of direct public expenditure 
on higher education from 80 percent to around 25 percent (see Figure 1). These changes have 
not been without controversy. The reforms were introduced in 1998 under a centre-left 
government – the Labour Party – and the subsequent increases occurred under the Conservative 
Party in 2006 and 2012. However, in recent years opposition parties have decreed in their party 
manifestos that they would phase out or reverse the reform fees.1 The suggestion being that 
these reforms – by shifting towards a fee-paying system – may reduce university access for 
those from lower-income households. The reformed system, however, also vastly increased 
means-tested support and reduced the financing constraints to students, making it unclear what 
the overall effects of the reforms would be for students from less financially advantaged 
background. For instance, compared with other OECD countries, the UK became the most 
generous in providing access to public loans, scholarships and grants (see Figure 2).  
From a simple theoretical point of view, the predicted effects of higher education 
reforms on university participation and other outcomes are not entirely clear. For higher socio-
economic groups, the absence of means-tested support, suggests that there is an unambiguous 
increase in the cost of education. However, for medium and lower socio-economic groups, there 
is an ambiguous effect. Although all students were obliged to pay tuition fees, there was 
progressivity in upfront costs through increases in means-tested grants. Moreover, there was a 
release in financing constraints with access to additional loans and protection against personal 
bankruptcy due to student loans. 
We find only very modest effects of reforms on both, the “intensive” and “extensive” 
margins, which contrast with the large budget savings. Regarding the extensive – participation 
– margin, we find a reduction in the participation gap among those entering university from
1 In the Liberal Democrats manifesto of 2010, it was stated that “We have a financially responsible plan to phase 
fees out over six years, so that the change is affordable even in these difficult economic times, and without cutting 
university income.” More recently, the Labour Party manifesto stated that “Labour will reintroduce maintenance 
grants for university students [scrapped in 2016/17], and we will abolish university tuition fees.” 
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higher and lower socio-economic groups. Overall, there is a small decrease in participation in 
response to the reforms of around one percent under the 2006 reform and no significant effect 
of the 2012 reform. Moreover, the modest reductions are only present for the highest socio-
economic group, while the participation effect for students from medium and lower socio-
economic groups is neutral or even slightly positive. On the other outcomes, we continue to see 
only small effects. There is a reduction in the distance travelled, suggesting that students seem 
to compensate increased tuition costs by reducing costs on other dimensions. However, 
although students from less wealthy households are generally more likely to attend university 
closer to home, following the reforms they are actually more likely to move further away. The 
effect on university choice and performance within university is quite mixed – improved 
completion rates among all students but also increased dropout rates for those from lower socio-
economic backgrounds. Finally, we observe marginally improved labour outcomes – in terms 
of employment status, type of contract, earnings –  for those from higher-income households 
and marginally worse for those from lower-income households. 
Overall, however, the most compelling finding is that these extensive reforms in funding 
higher education had only a small overall economic impact on student enrolment and other 
outcomes, with little (wealth) distributional effect. The heterogeneous effects do suggest that 
introducing progressivity in fees and releasing financing constraints have some differential 
effect across socio-economic groups. However, the findings are mixed and small. For instance, 
for students from less wealthy households the reforms had relatively little effect on enrolment 
and on their geographic mobility; however, it has a relatively more negative effect on program 
completion and on labour market outcomes, such as employment prospects, contract type and 
earnings.  
The education literature has largely focused on the effect of an increase (or decrease) in 
tuition fees on university enrolment. In the US, studies have shown that a $1,000 increase in 
fees decreases enrolment between zero and three percentage points and $1,000 increase in 
financial support increases enrolment between zero and six percentage points (Dynarski, 2003; 
McPherson and Schapiro, 1991; Kane, 1995; Cameron and Heckman, 2001).2 Similarly, in 
2 Dynarski (2003) uses a differences-in-differences approach to investigate the effects of an elimination of a 
student benefit programme in the US in 1982 on university attendance. The findings suggest an increase of $1,000 
in the grant triggered an increased probability of attending college by around 3.6 pp.  McPherson and Schapiro 
(1991) also focus on the US case and find that increases in the net cost of attendance have a negative and 
statistically significant effect on enrolment rates for white low-income families: a $1,000 increase in the net costs 
decreases enrolment by 6.8 percentage points (for both public and private institutions) and by 6 percentage points 
(for private institutions). Kane (1995) further analyses the role of increases in public tuition in the US on enrolment 
through exploiting different sources of variation in university costs. He finds that a $1,000 drop in tuition fees 
produces about a 4 pp increase in college enrolment. Cameron and Heckman (2001) find that a $1,000 increase in 
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Europe, a €1,000 increase in fees decreases the enrolment rate by 0.5 to 4.7 percentage points 
(Kelchetermans and Verboven, 2010, for Netherlands; Hubner, 2012, for Germany and Nielsen, 
Sorensen and Taber, 2010 for Denmark).3 Chapman and Ryan (2005) show that in Australia 
tuition fees income-contingent loans did not decrease the higher education participation rates 
of students from low income families. For the UK, Dearden, Fitzsimons and Wyness (2014) 
show that £1,000 increase in financial support increased enrolment by 3.95 percentage points, 
while Sa (2014) shows that £1,000 increase in tuition fees decreased applications to university 
by 1.6 percent. More recently, Murphy, Scott-Clayton and Wyness (2017), investigate the 
system as a whole and descriptively show that the shift to a fee paying system in England 
resulted in increased funding per head, rising enrolments, and a narrowing of the participation 
gap between advantaged and disadvantaged students. 4  
Our paper also relates to a literature that studies the effects of changes in the level of 
fees on other university related outcomes. For instance, Garibaldi et al. (2012) show that an 
increase by €1,000 in fees decreases probability of late graduation by 5.2 percentage points in 
Italy. Angrist, Lang and Oreopoulos (2009) show that financial incentives to improve academic 
performance had a modest effect in Canada. Several studies have highlighted the importance of 
distance on university enrolment (Card, 1995) and university choice (Long, 2004; Gibbons and 
Vignoles, 2012).5 Finally, there is a growing empirical and theoretical literature that aims to 
understand the optimal way to finance higher education (see, for instance, Lincoln and Walker, 
Pell grant entitlements triggers less than a 1% increase in enrolments, while a $ 1,000 increase in tuition fees 
produces a drop of around 6% in enrolments in 2 year colleges, but no effect on enrolment in 4 year colleges. 
3 Kelchetermans and Verboven (2010) analyse the university participation decision, where and what to study in 
the region of Flanders. The nested model estimates show that a uniform increase in tuition fees had a small effect 
on overall participation (only around 0.5 pp), but differential tuition fees imply large substitutions effects across 
institutions and fields of study. Hubner (2012) explores the effect of the introduction of tuition fees in sixteen 
German states in 2007 on enrolment rates. The differences-in-differences results show that the introduction of the 
fees at an annual rate of €1,000 reduced enrolment by 2.7 pp, and once the spill-overs are controlled for the 
estimated effected increases to around 4.7 pp. Nielsen, Sorensen and Taber (2010) estimate the effect on university 
enrolment of a change in student aid due to a Danish reform affecting students starting university in 1988 and find 
that a $1,000 increase in the stipend increased enrolment rates by 1.35 pp. 
4 Dearden, Fitzsimons and Wyness (2014) use data from the British Labour Force Survey between 1993 and 2006 
on university participation to analyse the impacts of tuition fees and maintenance grants on university enrolment. 
They find that a £1,000 increase in fees leads to a drop in participation of 3.9 pp. Sa (2014) uses aggregate data to 
explore variation over time, comparing England and Scotland, to study the effects of changes in tuition on 
university applications and participation rates. The study shows that an increase in tuition fees decreases the 
number of university applications, especially for courses with higher earning potential. Enrolment rates also drop, 
but no evidence of a stronger effect for disadvantaged students is found. Murphy, Scott-Clayton and Wyness 
(2017) describe in detail the main policy reforms since 1998 and using the British Labour Force Survey between 
1992 and 2016, show changes in participation by parents’ income. 
5 Card (1995) proposes that distance is an important determinant of college participation in the US.  Gibbons and 
Vignoles (2012) find that geographical distance has a significant effect on university choice in England, although 
it does not affect the decision to enrol. 
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1993; Salmi, 2003; Jacobs and Wijnbergen, 2007; Del Rey, 2012). The idea being that a well-
designed system could, potentially, be both efficient and equitable.  
Finally, there is a growing behavioral literature that suggests that individuals may make 
suboptimal investment decisions in higher education by mispredicting the costs of higher 
education (Horn et al., 2003; Usher, 2005). Students may also either be unaware of the available 
financial aid (Chan and Cochrane, 2008) or misjudge their eligibility for financial help (Zarate 
and Panchon, 2006). There is also evidence that these mispredictions are more present among 
low income students (Grodsky and Jones, 2007). 
By focusing on a wide series of outcomes, our study offers a comprehensive analysis 
on several dimensions of higher education reforms in England. Our paper contributes to the 
growing literature on higher education financing by providing insight into the impact of the 
reforms on enrolment, as well as a variety of other outcomes, including geographical mobility, 
university choice, choice of field of study, completion rates and (early) labour market outcomes. 
Using detailed longitudinal data, we follow students from school to university and study the 
enrolment impacts of reforms, which involved both higher tuition fees and improved access to 
more financial support for students from lower economic backgrounds.  Our rich data allows 
us to analyse two different reforms – 2006 and 2012 –  and also to understand their 
heterogeneous effects across socio-economic groups. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional 
framework, focusing on the recent higher education reforms implemented in England and the 
English education system. Section 3 presents the data used in the analysis, while section 4 
details the empirical strategy used. Sections 5 and 6 report the results for the 2006 reform and 
the 2012 reform, respectively. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Institutional Framework
In this section, we describe the higher education reforms that took place in England. To 
help understand the context, we then briefly describe the education system and the process to 
enter university. 
2.1. Higher Education Reforms 
Until 1998, students studying for an undergraduate degree – typically three year 
programs – could attend university free of charge. Starting in the academic year 1998, the 
government introduced a package reform that included the introduction of tuition fees. Students 
were obliged to pay a maximum of £1,000 per year, at the beginning of each academic year. 
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However, the amount paid was means-tested, such that the amount paid by each student 
depended on their family income. In particular, students were exempt from paying fees if the 
family income was less than £23,000 per year. For students from households where the family 
income was between £23,001 and £35,000, a reduced amount was paid, while those whose 
families earned more than £35,001 were charged the full fee. The tuition fee requirements and 
available support by income group for all regimes are summarized in Table 1. 
The Higher Education Act 2004, effective from 2006, changed the tuition regime again 
with three major changes: first, all students – irrespective of household income – were obliged 
to pay tuition fees; second, universities were given discretion over the level of tuition fees 
charged; third, the maximum amount of tuition fee trebled to £3,000 per year (inflation 
indexed).6 Most universities charged the maximum fee permitted of £3,000. In 2010, further 
reforms were announced. With respect to tuition fees, the most important change being that fees 
would increase to a maximum of £9,000 per year from 2012.  
From 2006, tuition fees were no longer means-tested, however, the reforms introduced 
several systems of support to less financially advantaged students to pay for tuition fees. The 
most prominent being that all students were eligible to apply for tuition fee loans from a 
government-backed student loans company – independent of their economic situation. These 
loans would cover the entire cost of tuition fees and were payable, in instalments, after 
graduation and once their income level exceeded a certain amount. In 2006, this was set at 
£15,000 and the income threshold for repayments increased to £21,000 in 2012. The loans were 
repayable with some interest, however, these were very small – 1.25 percent in 2006 and in 
2012, the interest rate was set at the maximum of RPI plus 3 percent for graduates earning more 
than £41,000.7  
In conjunction with the tuition-fees loan system, the reforms introduced means-tested 
related support. Means-tested maintenance grants, which stood at around a maximum of £949 
in 1998, were then increased substantially to a maximum of £2,700 in 2006 and £3,250 in 2012. 
Means-tested loans offered zero real interest rate loan of up around £2,400 in 1998, which 
increased to a maximum of around £4,000 in 2006 and to £5,200 in 2012. Maintenance loans 
increased for all throughout the reforms, although they were relatively smaller for students who 
benefited from maintenance grants.   
6 Devolution meant that Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales pursued different policies. 
7 In 2006, students would pay 9 percent of the value of the annual income in excess of £15,000. In 2012, students 
would still pay 9 percent of the value of their annual income, which was in excess of £21,000, but for students 
earning less than £41,000 the interest rate was smaller, equal to the RPI. 
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Table 1 summarizes all the fees and the financial support available to students based on 
their family income level under each of the three fee regimes. We present figures for the first 
year in which tuition fees were introduced (1998), the first year in which the tuition fees 
increased up to £3,000 (2006) and the first year with the tuition fees were trebled up to £9,000 
(2012).  
2.2.English Education System 
Full-time education in England is compulsory for all children aged between 5 and 16 
years old. The public education system – which covers around 93 percent of children – is 
organized into five Key Stages (KS). KS set the educational knowledge expected of students at 
various ages. Evaluations begin with KS 1, when students are aged around 7 years old, and 
marking the end of compulsory education, KS 4 is taken when students are around 16 years old. 
KS 4 is the national level examination also known under the name General Certificate of 
Secondary Education (GCSE). Most students take exams in around ten different subjects. 
Students have the freedom to choose which, and how many, subjects to take for GCSE, but all 
students are required to take GCSE English and Math.  
At the end of compulsory education, students decide to either finish formal education 
or continue their studies for two more years, choosing between a vocational or an academic 
track. For students aiming to go to university, the most common path is to take the final Key 
Stage – KS 5 – in three or four subjects. These are national level exams, known as the General 
Certificate of Education Advanced Level (A-levels). The choice of subjects tends to be closely 
related to the students’ university degree preferences and university admissions are largely 
determined by the test scores obtained at the A-levels.8 
When applying to a British university, students choose specific fields of study and their 
degree can vary in length based on the location and the subjects studied, with most lasting three 
years in England.9 In our study, we focus only on English universities as most of English 
students – around 95 percent – enrol in an English university (see Figure 3).  
8 Some universities like Cambridge or Oxford also ask prospective students to attend an interview as part of the 
admission process. 
9 The application process is centralised and each student applies through UCAS to up to five university-field of 
study groups. Applications are analysed separately by each institution-department and offers are made conditional 
on the grades obtained at the A-level exam, which is taken after the university admission process is ended. Students 
need to choose their top two preferences of the offers received before sitting the A-level and if they meet the grade 
requirements they can enrol into university. Students that did not meet the thresholds imposed by either of their 
two options may still find a free spot at university, which did not fill in all their positions by going into clearing. 
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In this section, we first describe the main data sources used in the analysis. We then 
proceed by presenting some summary statistics and describing the main outcome variables. 
3.1.Data 
We use individual-level data linking information from three main data sets: The 
National Pupil Database (NPD), the Higher Education Statistical Agency (HESA) and the 
Destination of Higher Education Leavers (DLHE). The data covers students who enrolled into 
university between 2004 and 2013, allowing us follow cohorts of students affected by the 2006 
and 2012 higher education reforms. Around 500,000 students completed compulsory school in 
English state school each year between 2002 and 2011. 
The NPD is provided by the English Department for Education and comprises of an 
administrative data set of all students enrolled in state schools in England – this represents 
around 93 percent of all English pupils, the remaining being enrolled in independent schools. 
We focus on students enrolled in secondary education and use mainly information contained in 
the Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC), which is one of the many data sets included 
in the NPD. In particular, we use detailed information on the geographical residence of pupils 
(we have information at lower layer super output area level, totalling around 32,400 areas), 
variables related to demographic characteristics (for instance, gender and ethnic origins), as 
well as students’ grades obtained at the GCSE.10 Although the data does not include information 
on parents’ income, the NPD dataset includes information on students’ social economic status. 
In particular, it includes a measure of wealth – the Income Domain Affecting Children Index 
(IDACI). This indicator is a continuous variable between 0 and 1 that measures the percentage 
of children aged 0 to 15 years old living in income-deprived families in lower layer super output 
area.11 For each cohort of pupils finishing their compulsory school, we group pupils into three 
wealth categories using the terciles of the IDACI score (when in secondary school). 12  
10  The lower layer super output area covers areas with minimum 1,000 (400) and maximum 3,000 (1,200) 
individuals (households). There are in total 32,482 lower layer super output areas in England in the period we 
consider. 
11 It should be noted that a household is considered to be income deprived if the household income (before housing 
costs and without housing benefits) is below 60% of the national median income and if they are receiving any 
form of income support or benefits. Source: Association of Public Health Observatories, 2012 Deprivation scores. 
Website: http://www.makingthelink.net/data-source/deprivation-scores  
12Using data on model-based estimates of weekly household income level at middle output area level (provided 
by the ONS) we calculated that in 2007 the first tercile of the IDACI score (i.e. the wealthiest students in our data) 
were residents in areas with an average weekly household income of around £800, while those in the second tercile 
were residents in areas average weekly income of around £660 and those in the third tercile were students living 
in areas with average weekly incomes of £560. 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics
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We link the NPD data to the HESA data. The latter contains information about the 
university and field of study pursued by English students graduating a state secondary school. 
In total, there are 116 universities.13 We have detailed information on fields of study, which we 
classify into five groups: Medicine, Dentistry and Allied Subjects; STEM; Social Sciences; 
Languages and History; Arts, Education, Other (See Appendix B for a detailed description). 
We use the Guardian League Table to define the ranking of the university. We use the yearly 
published league table ranking around 120 British universities between 2004 and 2013.14 The 
HESA data includes information about students’ behavior during university. More specifically, 
we can observe the length of degree completion, whether they dropout from university, whether 
they switch program. 
We further link the NPD and HESA data to the DLHE. The DLHE is a survey collecting 
individual level information on leavers of higher education six months after graduation. The 
available data allows us to track most of the students who finished their undergraduate degrees 
between 2006 and 2011 – covering the 2006 reform, but not the 2012 reform. It collects data 
on the personal characteristics of leavers, the details of their current employment – such as, 
employment status, the type of contract, earnings – and the further studies they pursued after 
finalizing their undergraduate studies. The response rate among UK domiciled students is 
reasonably high (around 80 percent).15 
This linked data set allows us to follow all students in English states schools from 
secondary education to post-compulsory education and, in many cases, the labour market. Our 
analysis is based on information on 10 cohorts of English students who started their 
undergraduate degree between 2004 and 2013.  
3.2.Descriptive Statistics 
In Tables 2a and 2b we present the main characteristics of the students in the sample 
before and after each reform – the 2006 and 2012 reform, respectively. In Table 2a, the first 
three columns refer to the period before the reform (i.e., the academic years 2004 and 2005) 
13 In order to control for changes in the supply of places due to university merges, openings or closures, a balanced 
panel of universities that reported a positive number of enrolled students at undergraduate level over the period 
2004/05-2013/14 is considered, totalling 116 universities. 
14 A comprehensive set of criteria is used in the construction of the ranking, including measures of the expenditure 
per student, staff-student ratio, job prospects, value-added, entry tariff, course satisfaction, teaching quality, 
feedback 
15   According to the HESA data the response rate for those graduating from full-time courses with a first 
undergraduate degree was: 81.8% (in 2004/05), 80.1% (in 2005/06 and 2006/07), 79.9% (2007/08), 
82.7%(2008/09), 83% (in 2009/10, 2010/11) and 82.3%( in 2011/12).  
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and the first four years under the new fee regime (i.e., the academic years 2006 to 2009). Panel 
A presents the demographic characteristics and the academic performance of students at the 
exam taken at the end of compulsory education, the GCSE. On average around 500,000 students 
sit the GCSE in an academic year. Overall, these characteristics are relatively unchanged before 
and after the reform. Comparing the ratio of female students before and after the reform, it 
seems that there has not been a significant change in the gender composition, with around 49 
percent of the students being females. Moreover, approximately 86 percent of students are 
White, with a constant share both before and after the change in tuition fees. As all pupils are 
required to take GCSEs in English and Math, we focus on these two measures of academic 
performance. Our summary statistics suggest that there is no change in the average grade for 
GCSE English before and after the 2006 change in tuition fees, and for Math, the average grade 
is slightly lower after the reform.  
Panel B presents the main outcome variables in our analysis. In the regression analysis, 
we will quantify, more specifically, the changes before and after each reform. Here, however, 
we will define the variables and explain how each is measured. The first outcome variable is 
the enrolment probability, which is defined as a categorical variable equal to 1 if a student is 
enrolled at age 18 as a first year undergraduate in an English university and 0 otherwise. We 
see that around 23 percent of students from state schools enrol in university – this seems 
unchanged before and after the reform. 
We next present the outcomes used to measure the geographical mobility of students, 
focusing only on those who pursue an undergraduate degree in an English university. Our main 
outcome variable is the geographical distance, which is measured as the log kilometre distance 
between a student’s home address at age 16 and the university attended. In order to calculate 
this distance, we use the coordinates of the centroid of the lower layer super output area, which 
is the most disaggregated geographical location we have access to, and the geographical 
coordinates of the university's postcode. We look at two additional geographic measures: 
whether the student is enrolled in a university located within the same commuting area as their 
home; and the wealth of the area in which the university attended is located, which we define 
as rich university.  We define the commuting area as the travel to work area which is denoted 
by the ONS as a collection of wards for which at least 75 percent of the economically active 
residents actually work in the area and for which at least 75 percent of those that work in the 
area actually reside in the area. We use average house prices, measured in each lower layer 
super output area in the third quarter of each year, which is provided by the ONS for the 
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definition of the rich university.16 In particular, we divide the house prices by quartiles and 
define a university as a rich university if it is located in area with house prices above the median. 
On average, students who enrolled before the change in tuition fees attend universities that are 
located at a similar distance from home when compared with those who enrol after the reform, 
travelling around 47 km. Around 21 percent of students are enrolled in the same commuting 
areas, independent of the time when they enrolled. The probability that students enrolled in a 
university located in an affluent area, however, fall from (52 percent) before the reform to (47 
percent) after the reform.  
Regarding university related outcomes, we construct a measure of university ranking 
using the Guardian League Tables (as described in the previous section). We focus on 
enrolment into a top 10 university or top 20 university – based on the ranking for the previous 
year (i.e., year of application). We see that around 9 percent study in a top 10 university before 
the reform, compared with only 7 percent after, while approximately 19 percent students study 
in a top 20 university, both before and after the 2006 reform.  
Our data contains 20 fields of study, but in order to increase the precision of our 
estimation we group them in 5 wider groups: Medicine, STEM, Social Sciences, Languages, 
and Arts and Education. We see that around 30 percent enrol in Social Sciences, followed by 
those in Medicine, Dentistry and Allied subjects and STEM degrees, with shares of around 23 
percent and 20 percent, respectively (see Appendix B for a detailed description). 
Using the DHLE survey, we also analyse the long-run effects of the 2006 reform. We 
focus on current status: employed, unemployed, further studies. Conditional on being employed, 
we look at the type of contract: permanent versus temporary, as well as their earnings – ln 
(annual earnings). We find that around 63 percent students are employed, around 7 percent are 
unemployed and 24 percent are pursuing further studies, independent of the fee regime under 
which they study. Moreover, among those employed, 64 percent are on a permanent contract 
and 86 percent work full time, earning around £18,900 annually. 
Table 2b replicates the structure of Table 2a, to provide the descriptive analysis of the 
before and after 2012 reform. The first three columns refer to the period before the reform (i.e. 
the academic years 2008-2011) and the first two years under the new fee regime (i.e. the 
academic years 2012 and 2013). Panel A provides the characteristics of all students who sat 
their GCSEs between 2005 and 2009. 
16 The ONS provides median house prices by middle layer super output area for each quarter. We link this data to 
the lower layer super output area using the mapping data set provided by the ONS. In order to keep prices constant, 
we also use the 2004 retail price index. 
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Comparing the ratio of female students before and after the reform, it seems that there 
has not been a change in the gender composition, with around 49 percent of the students being 
females. Moreover, approximately 85 percent of students are White before the 2012 reform and 
only 83 percent are White after the 2012 reform. Our summary statistics suggest that there is 
an increase in both the GCSE in English and in Math test score for those who sat the GCSEs 
after the 2012 reform. 
Panel B presents the outcome variables we are considering in the analysis. The first 
outcome variable is the enrolment probability and there seems to be a slight drop in the 
enrolment rate from 27 percent before the new tuition fees regime to 24 percent after the change 
in tuition fees up to £9,000. Regarding the geographical mobility, on average, students who 
enrolled before the change in tuition fees attend universities that are located at the same distance 
from home compared to the ones who enrolled after the reform –  travelling around 52km. 
Furthermore, around 17 percent of students are enrolled in a university located within the same 
commuting are as their home, independent of the time when they enrolled.  
Around 7 percent study in a top 10 university before the reform, and 9 percent study in 
a top 10 university after the reform. However, after the 2012 reform, the share of students 
studying in a top 20 university, increased from 15 percent to 17 percent. Regarding the field of 
study pursued, 30 percent enrol in Social Sciences, followed by those in Medicine, Dentistry 
and Allied subjects and STEM degrees, with shares of around 24 percent and 21 percent, 
respectively. 
4. Empirical Strategy
We estimate the effect of the higher education reforms on a comprehensive set of 
outcomes. Using a detailed set of controls, we match cohorts of students that enrol in university 
in the academic year that they turn 18 years old before each reform, with cohorts of students 
who have enrolled after the reform. In particular, as well as individual level controls, we can 
include detailed school and geographical fixed effects, we are comparing highly similar 
students before and after the reform. There are around 5,000 schools in the sample and 32,000 
neighbourhoods in England, such that, even within school, we compare at a more localized 
level.  
We estimate separately for each of the 2006 and 2012 reforms:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐗𝐢𝛼2 + 𝛼3 ln 𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 + 𝐹𝐸𝑟 + 𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1) 
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where yit is the outcome variable (for instance, the probability to enrol into higher education, 
logarithm of the geographical distance between home and university, university choice, field of 
study choice, length to completion of program, dropout rate, labour market outcomes). 𝑇𝑖𝑡  is a
categorical variable equal to 1 if individual i is enrolled as a first year student in year t after a 
change in the funding reform and 0 if they are enrolled in on the years before the implementation 
of the reform. For the 2006 reform, 𝑇𝑖𝑡 takes the value 1 if the academic year t is 2006 to 2009,
inclusive, and 0 for years 2004 and 2005.  For the 2012 reform, we define 𝑇𝑖𝑡 equal to 0 if the
academic year t is either 2008 to 2011, inclusive, and equal to 1 if the academic year t is 2012 
or 2013. 𝐗𝐢 represents a vector of individual characteristics (including, gender, ethnicity, wealth
index, grades in GCSE English and Math). ln 𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡, controls for changes in the cohort
size. We control for time trends, as well as their higher orders. We then include detailed fixed 
effects at the region level (𝐹𝐸𝑟), as well as at the school level (𝐹𝐸𝑠). 
 We cluster standard errors
at both school and local neighbourhood level (lower layer super output area). 
To estimate the differential effect of the reforms on different socio-economic groups, 
we estimate:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + ∑(𝑇 ∗ 𝜆𝑔)𝑖𝑡
3
𝑔=1
+  𝐗𝐢𝛽4 + 𝛽4 ln 𝐶𝑆𝑖 + 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 + 𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝐹𝐸𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡(2)
where 𝑔 represents different terciles of the IDACI score (when the student is in high school). 
These categories correspond well to the income distribution across neighbourhoods in England. 
17 Those in the lowest wealth index category correspond to an average household income of 
less than or equal to £29,000; those in the middle wealth index category correspond to an 
average household income of around £34,000; and, those in the high wealth index correspond 
to an average household income of around £43,000 or above. 
Overall, the impacts of the reforms are identified by closely matching students from 
different cohorts before and after the reforms. For instance, since we can identify students at 
the school level, we can match within school. We conduct several robustness checks – for 
instance, using different year cut-offs before and after the reform and performing placebo 
checks – to verify that our main effects hold.  
17Calculated using ONS data on model-based estimates of weekly household income level at middle output area 
level in 2007. 
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In this section, we present the main results for the 2006 reform. We begin by 
investigating the impact of the reform on enrolment among all students, as well as differentially 
by socio-economic group. We then analyse the impact on other margins among those who enrol. 
It is important to understand if the reform impacted other dimensions of higher education 
choices. Students might alter their choices relating to higher education that might then have an 
impact on outcomes because of their implications related to sorting – both in higher education 
but also on the labour market. In particular, their choice of institution, its location, and program 
of study, as well as behaviour when in university – such as dropout, year-repetition, and 
program switching. Finally, we link the impact of the reform to later outcomes in the labour 
market, including their employment status, type of contract and earnings.  
5.1.Enrolment to University 
Table 3 presents the results that estimate equation (1) –  the effect of the change in the 
higher education funding in England on enrolment rates. The baseline estimate (Column [1]), 
without any controls, shows that the 2006 reform actually increased the enrolment rates by 0.6 
percent. However, once we control for time trends and changes in cohort size, the overall effect 
is negative but insignificant (Columns [2] and [3]). Controlling for individual characteristics 
and neighbourhood fixed effects (Columns [4] and [5]), we find that the reform had a small, 
negative effect on enrolment to university (-0.7 percent). Including school fixed effect, which 
would essentially compare different cohorts of students from the same school, does not change 
the estimate (Column [6]). Regarding the other coefficients, it seems that females and top 
performing students in English and Math are more likely to enrol in university, while White 
students and those from lower income backgrounds are less likely to pursue an undergraduate 
degree. 
In Table 4 we re-estimate equation (1) separately by socio-economics groups. 
Interestingly, although the overall effect continues to be very small – the heterogeneity of the 
effect goes in the direction of having a stronger negative effect on the higher socio-economic 
group than the middle or lower. The estimated effect is around a 1.6 percent fall in enrolment 
among the highest group (Column [4]), -0.4 percent for the middle group (Column [5]) and a 
coefficient that is close to zero for the lowest group (Column [6]). This is likely to reflect that, 
while tuition fees increase the costs associated with attending university, the means-tested 
grants and loans protect those from the lower socio-economic groups. In particular, the 
provision of support, seems to have offsets the effect of tuition fees on university participation. 
5. Results: 2006 Reform
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However, it is again important to emphasis that, overall, the effects are small – even along the 
wealth distribution.  
To better understand the change in the enrolment gap across socio-economic groups, in 
Table 5 we estimate equation (2), which interacts the wealth index with regime change. The 
analysis indicates that, relative the highest wealth group, the impact of the reform has been 
weaker on the lower wealth incomes (as shown in Table 4). In turn, suggesting that the 2006 
higher education funding reform reduced the gap in enrolment across wealth groups.   
We conduct some additional checks on the main result. In Table A.1, we expand the 
number of wealth categories and find that the monotonicity in enrolment effect continues to 
hold even when looking more narrowly along the wealth distribution. In Table A.2, to further 
isolate the effect of the reform from adjustments in trends, we look at a narrow margin before 
and after the reform (i.e., comparing one year before with one year after). Generally, the main 
results remain largely unchanged.  
Overall, we find that the introduction of charging tuition fees of £3,000 per year to all 
student, combined with increased means-tested grants and loans reduced enrolment by around 
less than one percent. Moreover, much of this reduction is borne on those from a higher socio-
economic background. One potential explanation for these heterogeneous effects could be that, 
although the new funding schemes increased the tuition fees considerably, the financing 
constraints associated with higher education for those from lower socio-economic backgrounds 
were reduced. In particular, students were given access to means-tested grants of up to £2,700 
per year and loans of around £4,000 per year. The non-upfront payment of tuition fees might, 
in part explain the small magnitudes.  
5.2. Geographical Mobility 
Although the 2006 reform seems to have had only a small effect on enrolment, it is 
important to understand the impact on other dimensions. We start by looking at the impact on 
study-location choice.  First, we focus on the geographical distance between a student’s home 
and the university enrolled in. Second, we estimate the effects on the probability to study in a 
university located within the same commuting area and, finally, we estimate the effect on the 
likelihood to pursue a degree in an institution located in an affluent area.  
Table 6 presents the effects of the changes in the funding of the higher education on 
various measures of geographical mobility. Columns [1] to [3] present the effects on the linear 
geographical distance between a student’s home (as reported at age 16) and the university 
enrolled in (expressed in kilometres). Our estimates indicate that the distance to university fell 
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by around 2.7 percent. However, there exists a differential effect when we look across socio-
economic groups (Columns [2] and [3]). In particular, while those from a higher socio-
economic background are less likely to enrol into a university located further away from home 
after the reform, the students from less wealthy households are more likely to pursue a degree 
into a university located further away from home, with a higher magnitude for those in the 
bottom income distribution. In turn, the gap by wealth in geographical mobility seems to be 
closing.  
In order to understand better the effects of the reforms on students’ geographical 
mobility, we further consider the effects of the new reforms on the likelihood to study in a 
university located in the same commuting area. Columns [5] to [6] show that the changes in the 
funding reforms increase a student’s probability to pursue a degree in a university located in 
the same commuting area as a student’s home (0.7 percent), with stark differences in the areas 
students located, depending on economic background. In particular, after the reform, students 
in the top part of the distribution are more likely to study within the same commuting area than 
before, while those from the middle and the bottom of the distribution are more likely to study 
in a university located outside of the commuting areas. These findings are in line with the ones 
reported earlier, showing that students are more likely to respond to the changes in the funding 
of higher education by enrolling into universities closer to home. 
Finally, we look at university location based on the degree of affluence, as measured by 
local house prices. This is an interesting aspect to consider since we would expect affluent areas 
to have stronger local labour markets, which might benefit students when they graduate from 
university. However, these areas are also likely to be more expensive to live in the short-run as 
a student. This, therefore, generates a trade-off between short-term costs and (potentially) long-
run gains. We define the outcome as the probability to attend a university located in an area 
with house prices above the median. Columns [7] to [9] of Table 6 show that, on average, it is 
students from higher socio-economic backgrounds are more likely to locate for university in 
more affluent areas. However, the 2006 reform did not alter this gap – in particular, it did not 
deter those from lower socio-economic backgrounds from attending a university in a more 
affluent location.   
Overall, this section provides suggestive evidence of a fall in the wealth gap associated 
with geographic mobility as a result of the 2006 reform. In Table A.3, we exclude universities 
located in the capital, London, from our main analysis, since London, as a wealthy area and the 
city with many more universities than any other. Overall, we find that the effects do not seem 
to be driven by London. 
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5.3. University and Program Choice 
In this section, we investigate how the 2006 higher education reform affected the type 
of university and field of study pursued by students, as well as how it influences students’ 
behaviour within university. 
5.3.1. University Quality 
Using the standardized Guardian League ranking of the university (described in detail 
in Section 3), we investigate the change in the likelihood to attend a better ranked university as 
a result of the reform change. Column [1] of Table 7 shows that the 2006 reform had a small 
positive effect on attending a better ranked university – suggesting small changes in the supply 
of university places.  However, there was a small decrease of attending a higher ranked 
university among those in the lowest socio-economic background (Column [3]). There seems 
to be, however, some non-monotonicity in attendance by ranking. While enrolment among this 
group decreased in top 20 institutions (Columns [8] and [9]), it actually increased in top 10 
universities (Columns [5] and [6]). Overall, however, once again the magnitudes and economic 
significance are small. 
5.3.2. Field of Study 
Table 8 reports the effects of the 2006 reform on field of study choice. The outcome 
variable of interest is the probability to pursue one of the main five fields of study defined in 
Section 3 – Medicine, STEM, Social Sciences, Languages, Arts. Anticipating that tuition fees 
must later be repaid, students might be inclined to select programs that are associated with 
higher labour market payoffs or that are more vocational.  Overall, we find small effects. It 
seems that the 2006 had no overall impact on enrolment in Medicine (Column [1]) STEM 
programs (Column [3]), Language (Column [7]) related programs or Social Sciences(Column 
[5]), but reduced enrolment in Arts (Column [9]). Focusing on the gaps across socio-economic 
groups, we find quite mixed results. Our findings suggest that, relative to higher socio-economic 
groups, the 2006 higher education reform increased the probability of students from lower 
socio-economic backgrounds to pursue Medicine related degree by around one percent 
(Column [2]). However, the reform reduced the probability of this group to pursue a STEM 
degree by a similar amount (Column [4]). Relative to other groups, after the reform, the middle 
wealth group are less likely to enroll in a Social Science program (Column [6]). The middle 
and lower socio-economic groups are more likely to enroll in Languages (Column [8]) and, 
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finally, the highest socio-economic group is less likely to enroll in the Arts and Education 
programs (Column [10]).  
In Table A.4, we complement the analysis by computing the wage by field of study 
using the UK Labour Force Survey (2001). This allows us to check whether the reform 
influenced field of study selection based on perceptions of future returns. Overall, we find no 
effect of selecting a field of study with an above versus below median return after the 2006 
reform. However, by socio-economic groups there are some differences. In particular, the 
higher socio-economic group is likely to select into a higher paying field of study relative to 
the middle and lower group. 
5.3.3. Performance within University 
We now turn to student behavior in the institution enrolled. In particular, the likelihood 
of completing the degree program, as well as the length to complete and whether students switch 
programs.  The results are reported in Table 9. Column [1] shows the effects of the 2006 reform 
on the number of years to complete a degree.  Overall, it seems that the length to program 
increases slightly (1.4 percent). Across the income distribution (Columns [2] and [3]), the gap 
in completion narrows after the reform, since for the lowest socio-economic group the length 
of degree is shorter relative to the highest socio-economic group. However, this might, in part 
be driven by differential selection, since dropout rates among the lower socio-economic groups 
increases relative to the highest (Columns [8] and [9]). An indication that sorting might have 
been affected by the reforms relates to the increase in program switching following the reform. 
In Columns [4] to [6], we see that while there was no overall effect of the reform on students 
switching program, students from the middle and lowest socio-economic backgrounds are 
slightly more likely to switch degree programs and those from the highest group are less likely 
to switch. 
To sum up, it seems that once enrolled into an undergraduate degree, students from the 
lower part of the wealth distribution are more likely to dropout and even switch degree. 
However, again, the magnitudes are small.  
5.4. Labour Market Outcomes 
In this section, we connect the effects of the 2006 higher education reform to labour 
market outcomes. Using the DLHE data, which follows students after they complete their 
studies in higher education, we investigate the long run effects of the funding changes. We 
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focus on the current work status of the students, measured six months after graduation. If they 
are working, we look at the type of contract, as well as their earnings. 
Table 10 shows that, overall, the reform has a small negative impact on entering 
employment (0.8 percent) but a small positive effect on engaging in further education (1.3 
percent) (Columns [1] and [9], respectively), with no significant impact on unemployment 
(Column [5]). However, across the distribution there are some differences. In particular, for the 
lowest socio-economic group, we do see a relatively lower likelihood of employment (Column 
[2]) and a higher likelihood of unemployment (Column [6]), as well as a lower likelihood to 
enter into further education (Column [10]). This suggests an increase in the gap in employment 
prospects for low versus high wealth groups. 
Similarly, Table 11 suggests that, conditional on being employed, the 2006 reform had 
little overall effect on the types of contract – temporary or permanent (Columns [5] to [12]), 
however, we do see a reduced likelihood that students will be full-time employed (1.8 percent) 
(Column [1]). Moreover, the effect is stronger for the lower socio-economic group (Column 
[2]). This is further reflected in earnings of students after the reform change (Table 12). Overall, 
earnings increase very slightly (Column [1]). However, the increase is only for the highest 
socio-economic group (1.5 percent) and there is a negative effect on the middle and lowest 
group (relative fall by 1.5 and 2.5 percent, respectively).  
Although the impact of the 2006 reform on labour related outcomes are small, there do 
seem to be some differences across the distribution. These differences might be related to the 
differential behavior with respect to higher education related choices. However, all results are 
robust to the inclusion of field of study fixed effects and university fixed effects (Columns [3], 
[4], [7], [8], [11], [12]).  
6. Results: 2012 Reform
Although it is too early to study the medium to long-run impacts of the 2012 higher 
education funding reform, in this section, we briefly analyze some of the short-run impacts – 
such as enrolment impact, geographical mobility and university choice. 
6.1. Enrolment to University 
Table 13 presents the results from estimating equation (1) for the 2012 reform. The 
structure of the table is similar to Table 3. While the estimated effects of the 2012 reform are 
negative for all estimations, the most saturated estimate, presented in Column [7], indicates that 
the regime change did not have a statistically significant effect on the enrolment rate. 
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Overall, the analysis of the two reforms suggests that the change in the funding of higher 
education had a differential effect depending of the reform: while the 2006 reform dropped 
enrolment rates by 0.7 percent, the 2012 reform does not seem to have had a significant effect 
the enrolment rates. One potential explanation could be that the 2006 regime prompted a 
reaction from students affected by the reform. However, as the 2012 regime had a similar format 
as the 2006 and mainly introduced new levels of the support available, students seem to have 
already adapted to the new regime format and follow similar patterns of university enrolment 
to those before the 2012 reform.  
Table 14 shows the heterogeneous effects by wealth groups for the 2012 reform. 
Overall, it seems that for the highest socio-economic group, the effect of the reform was the 
largest, reducing participation by around -0.6 percent (Column [2]). For the middle and lowest 
group (Columns [4] and [6]), however, there is no statistically significant impact (-0.1 percent 
and 0.2 percent, respectively. Finally, Table 15 presents findings from estimating equation (2), 
replicating Table (5) but for the 2012 reform. When comparing across wealth groups, it seems 
that the new reform closed the gap in the probability to enroll in university by around 1 percent. 
The closure of this gap is somewhat larger than the 2006 reform (Table 5).  
6.2. Geographical Mobility 
Table 16 reports the estimates of the effect of the 2012 reform on various measures of 
geographical mobility. Columns [1] to [3] look at the impact of the reform on the distance 
between a student’s home and the university attended. Similar to the 2006 reform, the results 
suggest that the 2012 reform had a differential effect by socio-economic groups: while students 
from the highest socio-economic group enrolled into universities closer to home, the lower 
groups pursued degree into a university located farther away from home. Columns [4] to [6] 
present the results for the effects of the new reform on the likelihood to study in a university 
located in the same commuting area. Our estimates are in lines with those found after the 2006 
reform. In particular, following the reform, students from higher socio-economic backgrounds 
are relatively more likely to attend a university located within the same commuting area, while 
those from lower socio-economic backgrounds the less likely. Finally, Columns [5] and [6] 
investigate whether the reform affected the likelihood to attend a university located in an 
affluent area. Our findings show that the 2012 reform decrease the likelihood to attend a 
university located in a rich area for all students, independent of their economic background, 
with a larger effect found for those in the lower parts of the wealth distribution. 
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6.3. University and Program Choice 
Table 17 shows that, following the 2012 reform, overall, students are likely to attend a 
better ranked university (Column [1]). This is similar across wealth groups. This effect can be 
seen when looking at the likelihood to enroll into a top 10 or 20 university (Column [4] and 
[7]). Table 18 shows how the choice of fields of study changed due to the 2012 reform. The 
format of the table is similar to Table 8. Overall, there seems to have been little effect of the 
reform on field of study choice. As with the 2006 reform, the effects on Medicine and STEM 
are statistically insignificant, and there is a small increase in pursuing Language based 
programs, and a small decrease in pursuing Social Sciences.  Across the wealth distribution, the 
effects are small and mostly insignificant.  
7. Conclusion
Despite its growing interest, the intended (and unintended) consequences of the 
introduction of, and increase in, tuition fees have been unclear. In this paper, we estimate the 
short and long run effects of major reforms in higher education financing that took place in 
recent years in England in 2006 and 2012. Overall, we find small negative effects on 
participation. In particular, the change from charging (means-tested) £1,000 per year to £3,000 
a year to all students, reduced participation 0.7 percent. The changing from £3,000 to £9,000 
per year, had an insignificant negative effect on participation of -0.2 percent. Moreover, any 
decreases are borne mostly on those from the higher parts of the distribution. With respect to 
other margins: geographic mobility, university choice, field of study choice, length to 
completion of the program, (short-run) labour market impacts, we also find small effects. For 
instance, it seems that students do select universities that are marginally closer to home and, 
hence, suggesting they readjust on dimensions other than participation. However, again, these 
differences do not seem to negatively impact students from lower socio-economic backgrounds 
more.  
The modest effects of the English higher education funding reforms on the “intensive” 
and “extensive” margins contrast with the large budget savings. Part of the explanation for why 
the effects are small might relate to the structure of the system, which allows students to enrol 
at no ex-ante financial cost – reducing the barriers to entry. Moreover, by introducing 
progressivity in fees through a system of means-tested grants and loans, students from lower-
income household additionally experience a release financing constraints. The effects of the 
2006 and 2012 reforms are similar – if anything, stronger in 2006, despite the fact that the 2012 
reform is substantially larger. Part of the explanation might be that, while the format changed 
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quite dramatically in 1998 and 2006, in 2012, the main changes related to the amounts of tuition 
fees and maintenance support. Students seem to have adapted to the new system – for instance, 
by 2012, more than 90 percent of eligible students were taking up student fee loans.   
However, one key question is whether these reforms are cost effective in the longer run. 
Higher education is a risky investment and the student loans to which students in England have 
access to include some insurance. In particular, graduates repay tuition fees only once they have 
attained a predetermined income threshold. With respect to the 2006 and 2012 reform, this 
stood at a threshold of around £15,000 and £21,000, respectively. Moreover, any remaining 
debt would be written-off after 30 years. This suggests that some graduates will never be able 
to repay their loan in full. Although it is still too early to estimate the repayment rates for those 
affected by the 2012 reform, studies have projected estimate that, under the 2012 regime, 73 
percent of graduates will not repay their debt in full within the repayment period, compared 
with only 32 percent under the 2006 regime (Crawford and Jin, 2014). However, with respect 
to equity, the system of free higher education is likely to be regressive since more than 50 
percent of high school graduates do not go to university and those come, disproportionally, 
from low-income households. In the absence of a graduate tax (in the form of deferred 
repayments), higher education is typically absorbed into general taxation. An important next 
step would be to understand if, and by how much, the change in the tax system redistributes 
from lower to higher income individuals. 
The results suggest that the reforms did not negatively impact university enrolment 
among students from lower socio-economic groups. It might be that a budget-neutral reform 
that increases fees and channels these funds to means-tested support can, potentially be 
effective. Moreover, actions that reduce financing constraints and that link repayment to future 
income can be a cost-effective way to foster university education. However, it is important to 
look deeper at the wealth distribution – while the system might have adversely affected students 
on the margin from entering university, the system could potentially be improved to promote 
attendance among those lower in the distribution. 
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Figures and Tables 
FIGURE 1: SHARE OF HIGHER EDUCATION COSTS COVERED BY PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE 
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Notes: The graph shows the trends in the share of higher education costs, covered by public expenditure across different 
countries. 
Source: OECD Indicators, 2013, 2014, 2015 
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FIGURE 2: TUITION FEES VERSUS MEANS-TESTED SUPPORT IN 2013 
Notes: The graph plots the relationship between the average tuition fees charged by public higher education 
institutions in different OECD countries in academic year 2013/14 against the percentage of enrolled students who 
benefit from public loans, scholarships or grants at bachelor’s or equivalent level. It refers to full-time nation 
students only and the level of tuition fees is expressed in USD converted using the PPPs for GDP. 
Source: OECD Indicators,2013. 
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FIGURE 3: PERCENTAGE OF FULL TIME FIRST DEGREE UNDERGRADUATE 
ENGLISH DOMICILED STUDENTS BY REGION OF UNIVERSITY  
Notes: The plot shows the share of English full time UG students enrolled in English, Welsh and Scottish 
universities. 
Source: HESA statistics 2006/07, 2012/13 
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TABLE 1: AVAILABLE SUPPORT BY INCOME GROUP UNDER ALL THREE FEE REGIMES 
Parental 
Income (£) 
 Tuition 
Fees (£) 
Max  Tuition Fee 
Loan (£)  
 Maintenance 
Grants (£) 
Max Maintenance 
Loans (£) 
1998 2006 2012 
19
98 2006 2012 1998 2006 2012 1998 2006 2012 
<=10,000 0 3,000 9,000 0 3,000 9,000 949 2,700 3,250 2,255 3,205 3,875 
20,000 373 3,000 9,000 0 3,000 9,000 949 2,284 3,250 2,255 3,205 3,875 
30,000 1,172 3,000 9,000 0 3,000 9,000 569 832 2,341 2,315 3,573 4,330 
40,000 1,172 3,000 9,000 0 3,000 9,000 0 0 523 2,403 4,172 5,239 
50,000 1,172 3,000 9,000 0 3,000 9,000 0 0 0 2,403 3,305 4,788 
Notes: The figures for maintenance grants and maintenance loans refer to students who do not study in London and do 
not live at home with their parents. Source: Student Loan Company  
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Notes: The variables in panel A refer to all students in English state schools who sat the GCSEs between 2001/02-2002/03 
(the period before the reform) and between 2003/04-2006/07 (the period after the reform). The outcome variables 
presented in panel B refer only to students enrolled in a university in England at age 18, except for the enrolment variables 
which includes both students who did not enroll into university and those who enrolled at age 18 in an English university. 
TABLE 2a: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
2006 HE Reform 
Before reform (2004/05-
2005/06) 
After reform (2006/07-
2009/10) 
Mean Sd N Mean Sd N 
Panel A: controls 
Female 0.486 0.500 908005 0.487 0.500 1920422 
White 0.850 0.357 908005 0.856 0.351 1920427 
High Wealth Index 0.318 0.466 908005 0.319 0.466 1920427 
Medium Wealth Index 0.335 0.472 908005 0.336 0.472 1920427 
Low Wealth Index 0.346 0.476 908005 0.346 0.476 1920427 
GCSE English [std] -0.101 1.024 872673 -0.104 1.022 1856155 
GCSE Math [std] -0.094 1.020 885122 -0.101 1.019 1868372 
Panel B: outcome variables 
Enrolment 0.233 0.423 908005 0.239 0.426 1920427 
Ln (Distance between Home and Uni) 3.849 1.273 211295 3.849 1.260 459037 
Same commuting area 0.206 0.404 211295 0.201 0.400 459038 
Rich University 0.519 0.500 211295 0.469 0.499 459038 
Top 10 University 0.089 0.284 205533 0.066 0.248 445122 
Top 20 University 0.193 0.395 205533 0.189 0.392 445122 
Study Medicine 0.223 0.417 211295 0.237 0.425 459038 
Study STEM 0.205 0.403 211295 0.204 0.403 459038 
Study Social Science 0.304 0.460 211295 0.305 0.461 459038 
Study Languages 0.132 0.338 211295 0.120 0.324 459038 
Study Art or Education 0.136 0.343 211295 0.134 0.341 459038 
Employed 0.631 0.482 151701 0.632 0.482 332385 
Unemployed 0.07 0.255 151701 0.078 0.268 332385 
Further Studies 0.236 0.425 151701 0.233 0.422 332385 
Perm Contract 0.642 0.479 83067 0.621 0.485 195429 
Full time employed 0.861 0.346 95845 0.798 0.401 210120 
Ln (annual earnings) 9.841 0.291 46906 9.846 0.301 110482 
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Notes: The variables in panel A refer to all students in English state schools who sat the GCSEs between 2005/06-
2008/09 (the period before the reform) and between 2009/10-2010/11 (the period after the reform). The outcome 
variables presented in panel B refer only to students enrolled in a university in England at age 18, except for the 
enrolment variables which includes both students who did not enroll into university and those who enrolled at age 
18 in an English university. 
TABLE 2b: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
2012 HE Reform 
Before reform 
 (2008/09-2011/12) 
After reform 
 (2012/13-2013/14) 
Mean Sd N Mean Sd N 
Panel A: controls 
Female 0.486 0.500 988675  0.489 0.500 1049260 
White 0.853 0.354 988676 0.830 0.375 1049265 
High Wealth Index 0.326 0.469 988676 0.328 0.470 1049265 
Medium Wealth Index 0.336 0.472 988676 0.335 0.472 1049265 
Low Wealth Index 0.338 0.473 988676 0.337 0.473 1049265 
GCSE English [std] -0.077 1.019 934348 -0.040 1.006 1012031 
GCSE Math [std] -0.078 1.018 942462 -0.044 1.005 1015995 
Panel B: outcome variables 
Enrolment 0.266 0.442 988676 0.243 0.429 1049284 
Ln (Distance between home & 
university) 3.950 1.228 263031 3.962 1.238 255121 
Same commuting area 0.175 0.380 263031 0.174 0.379 255121 
Rich University 0.436 0.496 263031 0.738 0.439 255121 
Top 10 University 0.070 0.254 252203 0.088 0.284 244873 
Top 20 University 0.145 0.352 252203 0.170 0.375 244873 
Study Medicine 0.237 0.425 263031 0.239 0.426 255121 
Study STEM 0.207 0.405 263031 0.207 0.405 255121 
Study Social Science 0.301 0.459 263031 0.302 0.459 255121 
Study Languages 0.115 0.319 263031 0.117 0.322 255121 
Study Art or Education 0.141 0.348 263031 0.135 0.342 255121 
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TABLE 3: PROBABILITY TO ENROL INTO UNIVERSITY 
All All All All All All All 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
2006 HE Reform 0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.003 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Trend -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Trend Squared 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln [Cohort Size] 0.289*** 0.287*** 0.241*** 0.091*** 0.018 0.018 
[0.021] [0.021] [0.018] (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) 
Female 0.078*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
[0.004] (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
White -0.134*** -0.122*** -0.104*** -0.104*** 
[0.025] (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Wealth Index [WI] -0.577*** -0.148*** -0.136*** -0.136*** 
[0.024] (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
GCSE English [std] 0.107*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
GCSE Math [std] 0.131*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Region FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE No No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 2,828,432 2,828,432 2,828,426 2,828,421 2,713,923 2,713,430 2,713,430 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.071 0.315 0.347 0.347 
Notes: The outcome is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the student is enrolled into an English university at age 18 and 0 otherwise. 
The regressions refer to the 2006 reform and include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 2004/05-2009/10. The region FE 
are defined using the geographical residency of the student at age 16 (we use the 9 main regions in England defined by the ONS). The 
school FE are defined as the school attended by the student at age 16, when they sat the GCSEs. * denotes significance at the 10% 
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Robust standard errors clustered at lower layer super output area (defined when aged 16) and the school enrolled (at age 16) level, in 
parentheses in column [7]. 
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TABLE 4: PROBABILITY TO ENROL INTO UNIVERSITY 
High Wealth Index Medium Wealth Index Low Wealth Index 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
2006 HE Reform -0.012*** -0.016*** 0.002 -0.004* 0.003 -0.001 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Wealth Index [WI] -0.017*** -0.010*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.007*** -0.005** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Trend 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trend Squared 0.400*** 0.066* 0.266*** 0.005 0.144*** -0.038 
(0.042) (0.038) (0.035) (0.034) (0.030) (0.029) 
Ln [Cohort Size] 0.093*** 0.032*** 0.071*** 0.027*** 0.047*** 0.023*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female -0.072*** -0.083*** -0.108*** -0.112*** -0.135*** -0.124*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
White -1.512*** -0.581*** -0.574*** -0.208*** -0.166*** -0.057*** 
(0.042) (0.028) (0.014) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) 
GCSE English [std] 0.160*** 0.111*** 0.067*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GCSE Math [std] 0.166*** 0.123*** 0.090*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 900,568 883,411 948,448 915,036 978,158 914,515 
R-squared 0.137 0.379 0.138 0.334 0.139 0.290 
Notes: The outcome is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the student is enrolled into an English university at age 18 and 0 otherwise. 
The regressions refer to the 2006 reform and include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 2004/05-2009/10. Columns [1] 
and [2] refer only to students in the high wealth index group; columns [3] and [4] refer only to students in the medium health index 
group; columns [5] and [6] refer only to students in the low wealth index group.  The region FE are defined using the geographical 
residency of the student at age 16 (we use the 9 main regions in England defined by the ONS). The school FE are defined as the school 
attended by the student at age 16, when they sat the GCSEs.  * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 
5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Robust standard errors clustered at lower layer super output area (defined 
when aged 16) and the school enrolled (at age 16) level in parentheses. 
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TABLE 5: PROBABILITY TO ENROL INTO UNIVERSITY 
All All 
[1] [2] 
2006 HE Reform -0.011*** -0.014*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
2006 HE Reform * Med. WI 0.010*** 0.008*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
2006 HE Reform * Low WI 0.017*** 0.015*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Medium WI -0.101*** -0.051*** 
(0.002) (0.001) 
Low WI -0.183*** -0.074*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Trend -0.013*** -0.009*** 
(0.002) (0.001) 
Trend Squared 0.003*** 0.003*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Ln [Cohort Size] 0.241*** 0.010 
(0.022) (0.022) 
Female 0.069*** 0.030*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
White -0.111*** -0.105*** 
(0.003) (0.002) 
GCSE English [std] 0.105*** 
(0.001) 
GCSE Math [std] 0.125*** 
(0.001) 
Region FE Yes Yes 
School FE Yes Yes 
Observations 2,827,743 2,713,430 
R-squared 0.164 0.348 
Notes: The outcome is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the student is enrolled into an English university at age 18 and 0 otherwise. 
The regressions refer to the 2006 reform and include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 2004/05-2009/10. The region FE 
are defined using the geographical residency of the student at age 16. The region FE are defined using the geographical residency of 
the student at age 16 (we use the 9 main regions in England defined by the ONS). The school FE are defined as the school attended 
by the student at age 16, when they sat the GCSEs.  * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, 
and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Robust standard errors clustered at lower layer super output area (defined when aged 
16) and the school enrolled (at age 16) level in parentheses.
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TABLE 6: GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY 
Distance from home to university Same commuting area University in an affluent area 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
2006 HE Reform -0.027*** -0.039*** -0.048*** 0.007** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
2006 HE Reform * Med. WI 0.005 0.007 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
2006 HE Reform * Low WI 0.058*** 0.066*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.005 -0.003 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Medium WI -0.098*** -0.101*** -0.082*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.016*** -0.001 -0.000 0.003 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Low WI -0.236*** -0.276*** -0.229*** 0.049*** 0.061*** 0.053*** -0.009*** -0.006* 0.002 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Trend 0.011 0.011 0.016* -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.094*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Trend Squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln [Cohort Size] -0.150 -0.149 -0.049 -0.034 -0.034 -0.053 1.958*** 1.958*** 1.981*** 
(0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 670,104 670,104 669,660 670,104 670,104 669,660 670,104 670,104 669,660 
R-squared 0.271 0.271 0.296 0.268 0.268 0.277 0.246 0.246 0.251 
Notes: The regressions refer to the 2006 reform and include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 2004/05-2009/10. The outcome in the first three columns is the geographical distance 
between the student's home measured at age 16 and the university enrolled in at age 18, expressed in km. The outcome in columns [4] to [6] is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the student is 
enrolled into a university located in the same commuting area as their residency at age 16. The outcome in columns [7] to [9] is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the university in which the student 
is enrolled at age 18 is in area with house prices above the national median. The controls are female and white categorical variables. The education controls are the standardized GCSE in English 
and GCSE in Math grades. The region FE are defined using the geographical residency of the student at age 16 (we use the 9 main regions in England defined by the ONS). The school FE are 
defined as the school attended by the student at age 16, when they sat the GCSEs.  * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at 
the 1% level. Robust standard errors clustered at lower layer super output area (defined when aged 16) and the school enrolled (at age 16) level in parentheses.
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TABLE 7: UNIVERSITY QUALITY 
University ranking Enrol into a top 10 university Enrol into a top 20 university 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
2006 HE Reform 0.014* 0.024*** 0.010 -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.045*** -0.042*** -0.046*** 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
2006 HE Reform * Medium WI -0.007 -0.002 0.003 0.003** -0.004 -0.002 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
2006 HE Reform * Low WI -0.038*** -0.022*** 0.003 0.005** -0.010*** -0.006** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Medium WI -0.078*** -0.073*** -0.032*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.004*** -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.008*** 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Low WI -0.158*** -0.132*** -0.030*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.005*** -0.043*** -0.036*** -0.005* 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Trend 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.035*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.138*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Trend Squared -0.003** -0.003** -0.002* -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln [Cohort Size] 0.323** 0.323** 0.499*** -0.255*** -0.255*** -0.228*** -2.133*** -2.133*** -2.079*** 
(0.131) (0.131) (0.126) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.054) (0.054) (0.052) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 650,426 650,426 650,011 650,426 650,426 650,011 650,426 650,426 650,011 
R-squared 0.138 0.138 0.311 0.065 0.065 0.129 0.082 0.082 0.192 
Notes: The outcome in the first three columns is the normalized ranking of the university defined using the Guardian League Table. The outcome in columns [4] to [6] is the probability to enrol into 
a top 10 university defined using the Guardian League Table, while the outcome in columns [7] to [9] is the probability to enrol into a top 20 university defined using the Guardian League Table. 
The regressions refer to the 2006 reform and include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 2004/05-2009/10. The controls are female and white categorical variables. The education controls 
are the standardized GCSE in English and GCSE in Math grades. The region FE are defined using the geographical residency of the student at age 16 (we use the 9 main regions in England defined 
by the ONS). The school FE are defined as the school attended by the student at age 16, when they sat the GCSEs.  * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, 
and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Robust standard errors clustered at lower layer super output area (defined when aged 16) and the school enrolled (at age 16) level in parentheses. 
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TABLE 8: PROBABILITY TO PURSUE A FIELD OF STUDY 
Medicine STEM Social Science Languages Arts & Edu. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
2006 HE Reform 0.001 -0.003 0.003 0.008*** -0.000 0.003 0.002 -0.003 -0.005** -0.004* 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
2006 HE Reform * Med. WI 0.005* -0.006** -0.007** 0.006*** 0.002 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
2006 HE Reform * Low WI 0.011*** -0.014*** -0.004 0.006*** 0.001 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Medium WI 0.000 -0.002 -0.007*** 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.003*** -0.003* 0.009*** 0.001 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Low WI 0.001 -0.003 -0.009*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.004 -0.013*** -0.007*** 0.011*** -0.004** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Trend 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Trend Squared -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln [Cohort Size] -0.181*** -0.201*** -0.135*** -0.189*** -0.349*** -0.337*** 0.325*** 0.396*** 0.341*** 0.331*** 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.041) (0.042) (0.049) (0.049) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 670,104 669,660 670,104 669,660 670,104 669,660 670,104 669,660 670,104 669,660 
R-squared 0.032 0.036 0.102 0.143 0.024 0.031 0.031 0.076 0.035 0.063 
Notes: The outcome is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the student is pursuing a specific field of study 0 otherwise. The outcome in the first two columns is the probability to pursue a degree in Medicine. 
The outcome in columns [3] and [4] is the probability to pursue a degree in STEM. The outcome in columns [5] and [6] is the probability to pursue a degree in Social Sciences. The outcome variable in 
columns [7] and [8] is the probability to pursue a degree in Languages, while the outcome variable in columns [9] and [10] is the probability to pursue a degree in Arts or Education. The regressions refer to 
the 2006 reform and include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 2004/05-2009/10. The controls are female and white categorical variables. The education controls are the standardized GCSE in 
English and GCSE in Math grades. The region FE are defined using the geographical residency of the student at age 16 (we use the 9 main regions in England defined by the ONS). The school FE are defined 
as the school attended by the student at age 16, when they sat the GCSEs.  * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Robust 
standard errors clustered at lower layer super output area (defined when aged 16) and the school enrolled (at age 16) level in parentheses. 
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TABLE 9: BEHAVIOUR WITHIN UNIVERSITY 
Length Degree Switch Degree Dropout 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
2006 HE Reform 0.014*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.000 -0.010*** -0.011*** 0.001* -0.002*** -0.003*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
2006 HE Reform * Medium WI -0.006 -0.005 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
2006 HE Reform * Low WI -0.036*** -0.034*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Medium WI -0.012*** -0.008** 0.000 -0.019*** -0.027*** -0.017*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.003*** 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Low WI -0.019*** 0.006 0.025*** -0.036*** -0.049*** -0.027*** -0.017*** -0.021*** -0.008*** 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Trend -0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Trend Squared -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln [Cohort Size] -0.277*** -0.277*** -0.263*** 0.321*** 0.320*** 0.278*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.020** 
(0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 552,239 552,239 551,967 2,827,743 2,827,743 2,713,430 2,827,743 2,827,743 2,713,430 
R-squared 0.029 0.029 0.051 0.033 0.033 0.061 0.011 0.011 0.024 
Notes: The outcome in the first three columns is the number of years it took a student to graduate. The outcome in columns [4] to [6] is the probability to switch a degree. The outcome in columns 
[7] to [9] is the probability to dropout from a degree. The regressions refer to the 2006 reform and include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 2004/05-2009/10. The region FE are defined 
using the geographical residency of the student at age 16 (we use the 9 main regions in England defined by the ONS). The controls are female and white categorical variables. The education controls 
are the standardized GCSE in English and GCSE in Math grades. The school FE are defined as the school attended by the student at age 16, when they sat the GCSEs.  * denotes significance at the 
10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Robust standard errors clustered at lower layer super output area (defined when aged 16) and the 
school enrolled (at age 16) level in parentheses. 
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TABLE 10: ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
Employed Unemployed Further Study 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
2006 HE Reform -0.008** -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004** -0.005** -0.005** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
2006 HE Reform * Med. WI -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
2006 HE Reform * Low WI -0.009** -0.008** -0.008** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** -0.007** -0.007** -0.008** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Medium WI 0.004** 0.005* 0.005 0.003 0.005*** 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.005*** -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Low WI 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.012*** 0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 0.002 0.003 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Trend -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.013*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Trend Squared 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln [Cohort Size] -0.311*** -0.332*** -0.344*** -0.380*** 0.157*** 0.146*** 0.140*** 0.133*** 0.205*** 0.235*** 0.256*** 0.290*** 
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Education Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Field of study FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
University FE No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Observations 483,912 483,587 474,488 474,488 483,912 483,587 474,488 474,488 483,912 483,587 474,488 474,488 
R-squared 0.017 0.020 0.024 0.038 0.021 0.023 0.025 0.027 0.011 0.017 0.019 0.033 
Notes:  In columns [1] to [4] the outcome variable is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the student was employed 6 months after graduation. The outcome variable in columns [5] to [8] is a 
categorical variable equal to 1 if the student was unemployed 6 months after graduation; the outcome variable in columns [9] to [12] is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the student was pursuing 
further studies 6 months after graduation.  The regressions refer to the 2006 reform and include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 2004/05-2009/10. The controls are female and white 
categorical variables. The education controls are the standardized GCSE in English and GCSE in Math grades. The region FE are defined using the geographical residency of the student at age 16 
(we use the 9 main regions in England defined by the ONS). The school FE are defined as the school attended by the student at age 16, when they sat the GCSEs.  * denotes significance at the 
10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Robust standard errors clustered at lower layer super output area (defined when aged 16) and the 
school enrolled (at age 16) level in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Robust standard 
errors in squared parentheses.
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TABLE 11: CONTRACT TYPES 
Full Time Permanent Contract Temporary Contract 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
2006 HE Reform -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
2006 HE Reform * Med. WI -0.008** -0.007** -0.007** -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
2006 HE Reform * Low WI -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Medium WI -0.010*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.010** -0.011*** -0.009** -0.009** -0.007* 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Low WI -0.021*** -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** -0.024*** -0.012** -0.012** -0.010** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Trend -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.025*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Trend Squared 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln [Cohort Size] -0.260*** -0.257*** -0.212*** -0.188*** -0.391*** -0.426*** -0.360*** -0.390*** -0.334*** -0.302*** -0.347*** -0.302*** 
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Education Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Field of study FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
University FE No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Observations 305,859 305,676 299,171 299,171 278,396 278,219 272,122 272,122 278,396 278,219 272,122 272,122 
R-squared 0.034 0.040 0.047 0.053 0.020 0.025 0.035 0.043 0.022 0.031 0.037 0.047 
Notes: The outcome variable in columns [1] to [4] is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the student was employed full time 6 months after graduation. The outcome variable in columns [5] to [8] is 
a categorical variable equal to 1 if the student was working with a permanent contract, 6 months after graduation. The outcome variable in columns [9] to [12] is a categorical variable equal to 1 if 
the student was working with a temporary contract 6 months after graduation. The regressions refer to the 2006 reform and include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 2004/05-
2009/10. The controls are female and white categorical variables. The education controls are the standardized GCSE in English and GCSE in Math grades. The region FE are defined using the 
geographical residency of the student at age 16 (we use the 9 main regions in England defined by the ONS). The school FE are defined as the school attended by the student at age 16, when they 
sat the GCSEs.  * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Robust standard errors clustered at lower layer super 
output area (defined when aged 16) and the school enrolled (at age 16)
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TABLE 12: EARNINGS 
All All All All 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
2006 HE Reform 0.008** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
2006 HE Reform * Medium WI -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.012*** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
2006 HE Reform * Low WI -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.020*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Medium WI -0.011*** 0.004 0.002 0.002 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Low WI -0.026*** 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Trend -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.019*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Trend Squared 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln [Cohort Size] 0.304*** 0.316*** 0.353*** 0.388*** 
(0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.061) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education Controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Field of Study FE No No Yes Yes 
University FE No No No Yes 
Observations 157,307 157,209 153,845 153,845 
R-squared 0.078 0.107 0.144 0.179 
Notes:  The outcome is the natural logarithm of the annual earnings for those employed 6 months after graduation. The regressions refer 
to the 2006 reform and include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 2004/05-2009/10. The region FE are defined using the 
geographical residency of the student at age 16 (we use the 9 main regions in England defined by the ONS). The controls are female 
and white categorical variables. The education controls are the standardized GCSE in English and GCSE in Math grades. The school 
FE are defined as the school attended by the student at age 16, when they sat the GCSEs. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** 
denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Robust standard errors clustered at lower layer super 
output area (defined when aged 16) and the school enrolled (at age 16) level in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** 
denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Robust standard errors in squared parentheses. 
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TABLE 13: PROBABILITY TO ENROL INTO UNIVERSITY 
All All All All All All All 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
2012 HE Reform -0.012*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.002** -0.002* -0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Trend 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.080*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Trend Squared -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln [Cohort Size] -0.434*** -0.438*** -0.500*** -0.500*** -0.495*** -0.495*** 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.031) 
Female 0.076*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
White -0.155*** -0.126*** -0.108*** -0.108*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Wealth Index [WI] -0.539*** -0.112*** -0.107*** -0.107*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
GCSE English [std] 0.131*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
GCSE Math [std] 0.121*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Region FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE No No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 3,001,836 3,001,817 3,001,811 3,001,805 2,825,449 2,825,213 2,825,213 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.063 0.310 0.328 0.328 
Notes: The outcome is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the student is enrolled into an English university at age 18 and 0 otherwise. 
The regressions refer to the 2006 reform and include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 2008/09- 2013/14. The region FE 
are defined using the geographical residency of the student at age 16 (we use the 9 main regions in England defined by the ONS). The 
school FE are defined as the school attended by the student at age 16, when they sat the GCSEs. * denotes significance at the 10% level, 
** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust 
standard errors clustered at lower layer super output area (defined when aged 16) and the school enrolled (at age 16) level, in parentheses 
in column [7]. 
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TABLE 14: PROBABILITY TO ENROL INTO UNIVERSITY 
High Wealth Index Medium Wealth Index Low Wealth Index 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
2012 HE Reform -0.021*** -0.006** -0.011*** -0.001 -0.004* 0.002 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Trend 0.114*** 0.117*** 0.072*** 0.082*** 0.057*** 0.066*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Trend Squared -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln [Cohort Size] -0.683*** -0.724*** -0.393*** -0.410*** -0.289*** -0.320*** 
(0.057) (0.052) (0.047) (0.046) (0.042) (0.042) 
Female 0.084*** 0.027*** 0.067*** 0.024*** 0.053*** 0.026*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
White -0.082*** -0.084*** -0.115*** -0.112*** -0.145*** -0.127*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Wealth Index [WI] -1.203*** -0.402*** -0.502*** -0.152*** -0.158*** -0.052*** 
(0.033) (0.023) (0.012) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) 
GCSE English [std] 0.166*** 0.126*** 0.087*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GCSE Math [std] 0.147*** 0.112*** 0.091*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 973,221 944,249 1,006,724 953,780 1,020,565 926,923 
R-squared 0.123 0.353 0.123 0.316 0.130 0.286 
Notes: The outcome is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the student is enrolled into an English university at age 18 and 0 otherwise. 
The regressions refer to the 2012 reform and include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 2008/09-2013/14. Columns [1] 
and [2] refer only to students in the high wealth index group; columns [3] and [4] refer only to students in the medium health index 
group; columns [5] and [6] refer only to students in the low wealth index group.  The region FE are defined using the geographical 
residency of the student at age 16 (we use the 9 main regions in England defined by the ONS). The school FE are defined as the 
school attended by the student at age 16, when they sat the GCSEs.  * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at 
the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Robust standard errors clustered at lower layer super output area (defined 
when aged 16) and the school enrolled (at age 16) level in parentheses.
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TABLE 15: PROBABILITY TO ENROL INTO 
UNIVERSITY 
All All 
[1] [2] 
2012HE Reform -0.031*** -0.017*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
2012 HE Reform * Medium WI 0.023*** 0.020*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
2012HE Reform * Low WI 0.037*** 0.026*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Medium WI -0.094*** -0.042*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Low WI -0.168*** -0.058*** 
(0.002) (0.001) 
Trend 0.073*** 0.087*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Trend Squared -0.007*** -0.008*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Ln [Cohort Size] -0.433*** -0.482*** 
(0.031) (0.031) 
Female 0.068*** 0.027*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
White -0.119*** -0.107*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
GCSE English [std] 0.123*** 
(0.001) 
GCSE Math [std] 0.115*** 
(0.001) 
Region FE Yes Yes 
School FE Yes Yes 
Observations 3,001,260 2,825,436 
R-squared 0.029 0.246 
Notes: The outcome is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the student is enrolled into an English university at age 18 and 0 otherwise. 
The regressions refer to the 2012 reform and include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 2008/09-2013/14. The region FE 
are defined using the geographical residency of the student at age 16. The region FE are defined using the geographical residency of the 
student at age 16 (we use the 9 main regions in England defined by the ONS). The school FE are defined as the school attended by the 
student at age 16, when they sat the GCSEs.  * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level. Robust standard errors clustered at lower layer super output area (defined when aged 16) and the 
school enrolled (at age 16) level in parentheses. 
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TABLE 16: GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY 
Distance from home to university 
Same commuting area University in an affluent area 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
2012 HE Reform -0.010 -0.021*** -0.027*** 0.004* 0.008*** 0.009*** -0.374*** -0.357*** -0.358*** 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
2012 HE Reform * Medium WI 0.009 0.016*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.021*** -0.020*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
2012 HE Reform * Low WI 0.036*** 0.050*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.046*** -0.043*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Medium WI -0.094*** -0.097*** -0.077*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.015*** -0.002 0.005*** 0.008*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Low WI -0.223*** -0.235*** -0.186*** 0.044*** 0.048*** 0.039*** -0.007*** 0.008*** 0.016*** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Trend 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.071*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.941*** -0.942*** -0.943*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Trend Squared -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln [Cohort Size] -0.026 -0.028 0.037 0.025 0.026 0.015 7.102*** 7.105*** 7.116*** 
(0.133) (0.133) (0.131) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 753,475 753,475 752,257 753,475 753,475 752,257 753,475 753,475 752,257 
R-squared 0.255 0.255 0.279 0.247 0.247 0.254 0.368 0.368 0.371 
Notes:  The outcome in the first three columns is the geographical distance between the student's home measured at age 16 and the university enrolled in at age 18, expressed in km. The outcome in 
columns [4]  to [6] is  a categorical variable equal to 1 if the student is enrolled into a university located in the same commuting area as their residency at age 16. The outcome in columns [7] to [9] 
is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the university in which the student is enrolled at age 18 is in area with house prices above the national median. The regressions refer to the 2012 reform and 
include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 2008/09- 2013/14. The controls are female and white categorical variables. The education controls are the standardized GCSE in English and 
GCSE in Math grades. The region FE are defined using the geographical residency of the student at age 16 (we use the 9 main regions in England defined by the ONS). The school FE are defined 
as the school attended by the student at age 16, when they sat the GCSEs.  * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% 
level. Robust standard errors clustered at lower layer super output area (defined when aged 16) and the school enrolled (at age 16) level in parentheses.    
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TABLE 17: UNIVERSITY QUALITY 
University ranking Enrol into a top 10 university Enrol into a top 20 university 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
2012 HE Reform 0.052*** 0.048*** 0.036*** 0.008*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.066*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
2012 HE Reform * Medium WI 0.004 0.020*** -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.001 0.003 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
2012 HE Reform * Low WI 0.014* 0.046*** -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.010*** -0.001 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Medium WI -0.088*** -0.089*** -0.041*** -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.002* -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.011*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Low WI -0.172*** -0.177*** -0.063*** -0.023*** -0.016*** 0.001 -0.044*** -0.040*** -0.010*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Trend -0.010 -0.010 -0.026*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.049*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Trend Squared 0.000 0.000 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln [Cohort Size] 0.191 0.190 0.295** -0.226*** -0.225*** -0.209*** -1.800*** -1.799*** -1.774*** 
(0.136) (0.136) (0.130) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.057) (0.057) (0.055) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 723,876 723,876 722,707 723,876 723,876 722,707 723,876 723,876 722,707 
R-squared 0.139 0.139 0.326 0.058 0.059 0.121 0.085 0.085 0.186 
Notes: The outcome in the first three columns is the normalized ranking of the university defined using the Guardian League Table. The outcome in columns [4] to [6] is the probability to enrol into 
a top 10 university defined using the Guardian League Table, while the outcome in columns [7] to [9] is the probability to enrol into a top 20 university defined using the Guardian League Table. 
The regressions refer to the 2012 reform and include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 2008/09-2013/14. The controls are female and white categorical variables. The education controls 
are the standardized GCSE in English and GCSE in Math grades. The region FE are defined using the geographical residency of the student at age 16 (we use the 9 main regions in England defined 
by the ONS). The school FE are defined as the school attended by the student at age 16, when they sat the GCSEs.  * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, 
and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Robust standard errors clustered at lower layer super output area (defined when aged 16) and the school enrolled (at age 16) level in parentheses. 
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TABLE 18: PROBABILITY TO PURSUE A FIELD OF STUDY 
Medicine STEM Social Science Languages Arts & Education 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
2012 HE Reform -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.006** -0.005* 0.006*** 0.004 -0.000 0.001 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
2012 HE Reform * Med. WI -0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.005*** -0.001 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
2012 HE Reform * Low WI -0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.007*** -0.003 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Medium WI 0.003** 0.006*** -0.007*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.001 0.009*** 0.002* 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Low WI 0.005*** 0.011*** -0.012*** 0.002 0.006*** -0.006** -0.012*** -0.004*** 0.012*** -0.003** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Trend -0.007** -0.007** -0.005 -0.004 -0.016*** -0.016*** 0.005* 0.002 0.024*** 0.025*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Trend Squared 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000* -0.000 -0.002*** -0.002*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln [Cohort Size] 0.187*** 0.172*** 0.069 0.013 0.015 0.030 -0.047 0.012 -0.225*** -0.226*** 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.048) (0.047) (0.061) (0.060) (0.041) (0.042) (0.044) (0.043) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 753,475 752,257 753,475 752,257 753,475 752,257 753,475 752,257 753,475 752,257 
R-squared 0.025 0.029 0.099 0.152 0.024 0.036 0.030 0.078 0.039 0.071 
Notes: The outcome is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the student is pursuing a specific field of study 0 otherwise. The outcome in the first two columns is the probability to pursue a degree in 
Medicine. The outcome in columns [3] and [4] is the probability to pursue a degree in STEM. The outcome in columns [5] and [6] is the probability to pursue a degree in Social Sciences. The 
outcome variable in columns [7] and [8] is the probability to pursue a degree in Languages, while the outcome variable in columns [9] and [10] is the probability to pursue a degree in Arts or 
Education. The regressions refer to the 2012 reform and include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 2008/09-2013/14. The controls are female and white categorical variables. The 
education controls are the standardized GCSE in English and GCSE in Math grades. The region FE are defined using the geographical residency of the student at age 16 (we use the 9 main regions 
in England defined by the ONS). The school FE are defined as the school attended by the student at age 16, when they sat the GCSEs.  * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance 
at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Robust standard errors clustered at lower layer super output area (defined when aged 16) and the school enrolled (at age 16) level in 
parentheses. 
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures 
TABLE A.1: ROBUSTNESS – PROBABILITY TO ENROL INTO UNIVERSITY (5 Wealth Categories) 
2006 Reform 2012 Reform 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
HE Reform -0.002 -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.010*** -0.036*** -0.022*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
HE Reform * 2nd quantile 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
HE Reform * 3rd quantile 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
HE Reform * 4th quantile 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.041*** 0.033*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
HE Reform * 5th quantile 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.043*** 0.029*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 2nd quantile -0.067*** -0.071*** -0.041*** -0.059*** -0.065*** -0.034*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
3rd quantile -0.120*** -0.127*** -0.066*** -0.109*** -0.119*** -0.056*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
4th quantile -0.175*** -0.186*** -0.088*** -0.157*** -0.172*** -0.071*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
5th quantile -0.216*** -0.230*** -0.092*** -0.194*** -0.209*** -0.072*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Trend -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.009*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.086*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Trend Squared 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln [Cohort Size] 0.238*** 0.238*** 0.010 -0.436*** -0.434*** -0.482*** 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Region and School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,827,743 2,827,743 2,713,430 3,000,932 2,825,213 2,825,436 
R-squared 0.166 0.166 0.349 0.145 0.329 0.246 
Notes: The outcome is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the student is enrolled into an English university at age 18 and 0 otherwise. The first three regressions refer to the 2006 reform and include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 
2004/05-2009/10. Regressions in columns [4] to [6] refer to the 2012 reform and include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 2008/09-2013/14. The region FE are defined using the geographical residency of the student at age 16. The 
region FE are defined using the geographical residency of the student at age 16 (we use the 9 main regions in England defined by the ONS).  The controls are female and white categorical variables. The education controls are the standardized 
GCSE in English and GCSE in Math grades. The school FE are defined as the school attended by the student at age 16, when they sat the GCSEs. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. Robust standard errors clustered at lower layer super output area (defined when aged 16) and the school enrolled (at age 16) level in parentheses.
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TABLE A.2: ROBUSTNESS – LOCALIZED EFFECT OF REFORM 
2006 Reform 2012 Reform 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
HE Reform -0.001 -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.029*** -0.047*** -0.043*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
HE Reform * Med. WI 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
HE Reform * Low WI 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.032*** 0.026*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Medium WI -0.096*** -0.102*** -0.055*** -0.088*** -0.099*** -0.044*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Low WI -0.173*** -0.181*** -0.079*** -0.157*** -0.173*** -0.061*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 954,687 954,687 934,919 993,274 993,274 942,676 
R-squared 0.171 0.171 0.342 0.151 0.151 0.342 
Notes: The outcome is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the student is enrolled into an English university at age 18 and 0 
otherwise.  The first three regressions refer to the 2006 reform and include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 
2005/06-2006/07. The regressions in columns [4] to [6] refer to the 2012 reform and include data on 1st year UG students 
enrolled between 2011/12- 2012/13. The controls are female and white categorical variables. The education controls are the 
standardized GCSE in English and GCSE in Math grades. The region FE are defined using the geographical residency of the 
student at age 16 (we use the 9 main regions in England defined by the ONS). The school FE are defined as the school attended 
by the student at age 16, when they sat the GCSEs.  * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% 
level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Robust standard errors clustered at lower layer super output area (defined 
when aged 16) and the school enrolled (at age 16) level in parentheses. 
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TABLE A.3: ROBUSTNESS - EXCLUDE LONDON UNIVERSITIES 
2006 Reform 2012 Reform 
Enrolment rate Distance from home to university Enrolment rate Distance from home to university 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
HE Reform -0.003* -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.031*** -0.034*** -0.043*** -0.009*** -0.030*** -0.017*** -0.013* -0.021*** -0.027*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
HE Reform * Med. WI 0.010*** 0.008*** -0.002 0.000 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.007 0.014** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) 
HE Reform * Low WI 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.021** 0.031*** 0.040*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.042*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) 
Medium WI -0.093*** -0.100*** -0.052*** -0.096*** -0.095*** -0.075*** -0.085*** -0.094*** -0.044*** -0.093*** -0.096*** -0.075*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Low WI -0.168*** -0.179*** -0.076*** -0.230*** -0.245*** -0.197*** -0.153*** -0.167*** -0.061*** -0.214*** -0.224*** -0.174*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Trend -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.009*** 0.012 0.012 0.018** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.083*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.066*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Trend Squared 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln [Cohort Size] 0.231*** 0.231*** 0.008 -0.136 -0.136 -0.053 -0.405*** -0.402*** -0.459*** -0.075 -0.076 0.003 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.131) (0.131) (0.130) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.151) (0.151) (0.149) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,760,609 2,760,609 2,646,380 602,988 602,988 602,625 2,924,529 2,924,529 2,748,983 677,081 677,081 676,026 
R-squared 0.156 0.156 0.333 0.284 0.284 0.312 0.135 0.136 0.315 0.276 0.276 0.302 
Notes: The outcome in the first three columns is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the student is enrolled into an English university at age 18 and 0 otherwise.  The outcome in columns [4] to [6] is the geographical 
distance between the student's home measured at age 16 and the university enrolled in at age 18, expressed in km. The regressions refer to the 2006 reform and include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 
2004/05-2009/10. Regressions in columns [7] to [12] refer to the 2012 reform and include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 2008/09-2013/14.  The regressions do not include any London based university. 
The controls are female and white categorical variables. The education controls are the standardized GCSE in English and GCSE in Math grades. The region FE are defined using the geographical residency of the 
student at age 16 (we use the 9 main regions in England defined by the ONS). The school FE are defined as the school attended by the student at age 16, when they sat the GCSEs.  * denotes significance at the 10% 
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Robust standard errors clustered at lower layer super output area (defined when aged 16) and the school enrolled (at age 16) 
level in parentheses. 
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TABLE A.4: ROBUSTNESS - WAGES BY FIELD OF STUDY 
2006 Reform 2012 Reform 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 HE Reform 0.004 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.004 0.004 0.002 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
HE Reform * Med. WI -0.011*** -0.011*** 0.001 0.003 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
HE Reform * Low WI -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.003 0.000 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Medium WI -0.011*** -0.003 0.003 -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.010*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Low WI -0.013*** -0.001 0.014*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.005** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Trend 0.007** 0.007** 0.008** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Trend Squared -0.001** -0.001** -0.001* 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln [Cohort Size] -0.468*** -0.468*** -0.475*** 0.169*** 0.170*** 0.153** 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 666,571 666,571 666,145 750,124 750,124 748,927 
R-squared 0.065 0.066 0.082 0.063 0.063 0.083 
Notes:  The outcome is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the student has pursued a degree with a wage above the 
median of the expected wages by field of study pursued. The first three regressions refer to the 2006 reform and include 
data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 2004/05- 2009/10. The last three regressions refer to the 2012 reform and 
include data on 1st year UG students enrolled between 2008/09-2013/14. The controls are female and white categorical 
variables. The education controls are the standardized GCSE in English and GCSE in Math grades. The region FE are 
defined using the geographical residency of the student at age 16 (we use the 9 main regions in England defined by the 
ONS). The school FE are defined as the school attended by the student at age 16, when they sat the GCSEs.  * denotes 
significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
Robust standard errors clustered at lower layer super output area (defined when aged 16) and the school enrolled (at age 
16) level in parentheses.
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Appendix B: Definitions 
Undergraduate Degree Definition 
The undergraduate students who represent the student population considered in this analysis are formed or two 
categories of students: first degree and other undergraduate degree. According to HESA, the First degree includes 
first degrees with or without eligibility to register to practice with a Health or Social Care or Veterinary statutory 
regulatory body, first degrees with qualified teacher status (QTS)/registration with the General Teaching Council 
(GTC), enhanced first degrees, first degrees obtained concurrently with a diploma and intercalated first degrees. 
Other undergraduate includes qualification aims below degree level such as Foundation Degrees, diplomas in HE 
with eligibility to register to practice with a Health or Social Care regulatory body, Higher National Diploma 
(HND), Higher National Certificate (HNC), Diploma of Higher Education (DipHE), Certificate of Higher 
Education (CertHE), foundation courses at HE 115 level, NVQ/SVQ levels 4 and 5, post-degree diplomas and 
certificates at undergraduate level, professional qualifications at undergraduate level, other undergraduate 
diplomas and certificates including post registration health and social care courses, other formal HE qualifications 
of less than degree standard, institutional undergraduate credit and no formal undergraduate qualifications. The 
coding also accounts for the mapping between the old and the new codes which was introduced in 2007/08.18 
Field of Study 
In the HESA data there are 20 major field of study pursued at higher education level, but 
we group the fields of study in 5 groups as below in order to increase precision: 
TABLE B: CODING OF FIELD OF STUDY 
JACS 20 Groups 5 Subject Groups 
Medicine and Dentistry Medicine, Dentistry and Allied Subjects 
Other Medical Subjects Medicine, Dentistry and Allied Subjects 
Biological Sciences Medicine, Dentistry and Allied Subjects 
Veterinary Sciences and Agriculture Medicine, Dentistry and Allied Subjects 
Physical Sciences Medicine, Dentistry and Allied Subjects 
Math and Computer Sciences STEM 
Engineering STEM 
Technology STEM 
Architecture, Building and Planning STEM 
Social Sciences Social Sciences 
Law Social Sciences 
Business and Administration Social Sciences 
Mass Communication & Documentation Languages and History 
Linguistics and Classics Languages and History 
European Languages Languages and History 
Modern Languages Languages and History 
History Languages and History 
Creative Arts and Design Education, Arts and Other 
Education Education, Arts and Other 
Combined Education, Arts and Other 
18  Source: HESA undergraduate degree mapping. Website https://www:hesa:ac:uk/data-and-analysis/performance-
indicators/definitions#level-study-applicable-all-tables 
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GCSE Grades 
For the period under analysis, the grading system of the GCSEs changed. Based on the information provided by 
Ofsted and Ofqual, the following scales were used in the calculation of the grades obtained in the GCSE in 
English and in Math: 
TABLE C: GRADING SYSTEMS GCSEs 
Panel A: Single Awards 
Grade    
A*  A   B   C D E       F      G  
Old points(before 2004) 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
New points(2004 onwards)  58 52 46 40 34 28 22 16 
Panel B: Double Awards 
Grade   A*A
* 
A*
A 
A
A 
A
B 
B
B 
B
C 
C
C 
C
D 
D
D 
D
E 
E
E 
E
F 
F
F 
F
G 
G
G  
New points (2008 onwards) 58 55 52 49 46 43 40 37 34 31 28 25 22 19 16 
Notes: Double Award GCSE subjects are certificated on a fifteen-point scale for the first time in the June 2008 
examination. For the Double Awards, the grade is recorded twice on the certificate to indicate that the results in these 
specifications have the same status as GCSE grades in two other single-certificate subjects. Source Ofsted and Ofqual, 
available online at: register.ofqual.gov.uk/Qualification/PerformanceMeasures?qualificationNumber=100_2257_0; 
www.wjec.co.uk/gcse-explanation-of-results-summer-2014.pdf; www.jcq.org.uk/exams-office/results-and 
certification/grading-of-double-award-gcse-subjects-april-2008-despatch+ 
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